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Clare F. Beckton*

A. G. for Canada et al v.
Claire Dupond:
The Right to Assemble in
Canada?

The renewal of the Federation must confirm the pre-eminence of
citizens over institutions, guarantee their rights and freedoms and
ensure that these rights and freedoms are inalienable. 1
These words from Prime Minister Trudeau are a reflection of the
concern today for protection of individual rights and freedoms. His
words also reflect the past concerns with protection of individual rights
and freedoms particularly in countries which espouse democratic
principles. He has recognized that the balance between individual and
state interests must be struck in favour of the individual. In order to
achieve this result, there must be some consensus in a nation as to what
are to be rights and freedoms worthy of protection.
Demonstrations, assemblies, parades and street comer orators have
been an integral part of the way of life in common law countries such as
the United States, Great Britain and Canada. In the United States these
assertions of individual liberty are regarded as part of the fundamental
freedoms which their constitutional Bill of Rights guarantees will be
protected. In Canada, the Supreme Court made it clear on January 19,
1978 that they did not regard demonstrations and street assemblies as
fundamental rights or, for that matter, as individual rights at all. 2 They
chose, rather to place the state interest above the interest of the
individual at a time of political crisis when individual rights are most in
need of protection. Although this decision is ostensibly limited to
parades, assemblies and demonstrations it could have future
implications when other courts are attempting to define the limits of
individual liberty. It is this restrictive concept of fundamental
freedoms which will create most concern for the future.
I. FactualBackground
A. G. for Canada v. Claire Dupond3 began in 1969 in the City of
*Clare F. Beckton, Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University
1. A Time for Action - A White Paper on the Constitution presented to Parliament
on June 12, 1978
2. A. G. for Canada et al v. Claire Dupond (1978), 19 N.R. 478
3. Id.
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Montreal. At this time there were a number of parades, demonstrations
and assemblies associated with the F.L.Q. movement. In response to
the growing violence, the City of Montreal enacted a By-law which
provided for absolute prohibition of any demonstrations, parades or
gatherings upon receipt of reports by the City Executive Committee
from the city police and legal department stating that there were
5. . . . reasonable grounds to believe that the holding of
assemblies, parades or gatherings will cause tumult and endanger
safety, peace or public order or give rise to such acts. .... 4
The By-law did not specify any period for which these demonstrations
could be forbidden but left it open to the Executive Committee who
could
5. . . . by ordinance take measures to prevent or suppress such
dangers by prohibiting for the period that it shall determine, at all
times or at the hours it shall set on all or part of the public domain of
the city, the holding of any orall assemblies, parades orgatherings. 5
The preamble to the By-law stated that it was a
By-law relating to exceptional measures to safeguard the free
exercise of civil liberties, to regulate the use of the public domain
and to prevent
riots and other violations of order, peace and public
6
safety.
On November 12, 1969 the Executive Committee met and, pursuant
to reports from the Director of the Police Department and the Law
Department 7 they passed an "ORDINANCE TO PROHIBIT THE
HOLDING OF ANY ASSEMBLY, PARADE OR GATHERING ON
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF THE CITY OF MONTREAL FOR A
TIME PERIOD OF 30 DAYS." The ordinance was based upon the
information contained in the report from the city police director who
pointed out that in the previous two months, demonstrations had
increased and agitators had infiltrated crowds resulting in violence.
Adding this violence to the frequency of violence in the past, the police
felt that it would be impossible to guarantee against such recurrences in
the future.
This By-law and ordinance were challenged by Claire Dupond who
was a ratepayer of the City of Montreal. At trial the judge concluded
that section 5 of the By-law created a new offence which was intended
4. By-law 3926 of the City of Montreal
5. Id.
6. Id.

7. Pursuant to By-law 3926
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to supplement the Criminal Code. Therefore, the ordinance was in
relation to criminal law and ultra vires the Province. 8 On appeal, the
Quebec Court of Appeal characterized the By-law and ordinance as
local police regulations thereby falling within the domain of provincial
jurisdiction. 9
Claire Dupond continued her challenge to the Supreme Court of
Canada. In the Supreme Court the By-law and ordinance were
challenged on the following two grounds:
1.They are in relation to Criminal law and ultra vires of the City of
Montreal and of the Provincial legislature;
2. They are in relation to and in conflict with the fundamental
freedoms of speech, of assembly and association, of the press and of
religion, which are made part of the constitution by the preamble of
the British North America Act, 1867 ....10
H. Federal vs. ProvincialJurisdiction
The majority in the Supreme Court of Canada supported the position
adopted by the Court of Appeal on the first ground. They immediately
characterized the By-law, by reference to the early Privy Council
decision in Hodge v. The Queen, 1x as pertaining to local matters. They
regarded it as a preventive, not a punitive measure because it
prohibited all assemblies, parades or gatherings whether violent or
innocuous. But then the court maintained that the By-law was more
than purely prohibitory because the potential existed for restricting
demonstrations to specific times and locations. It is clear, however,
that the By-law was primarily intended to prohibit activity rather than
merely regulate it, in contrast to the Ontario Liquor Licensing Act in
Hodge which created a broad regulatory scheme. The Act in Hodge
was not simply aimed at preventing activity but it was also directed to
how a particular activity could occur. In other words, any sanctions
attached to this Liquor legislation were attached to a valid provincial
regulatory scheme. This decision is not support for the Montreal
By-law which had as its primary focus the prevention of violent
activity on the streets whether caused by a member of the assembly or
by by-standers apart from the assembled group.
The Court in Dupond then engaged in a circular reasoning process
by arguing that when an enactment is itself of a local nature "the onus
8. A. G. for Canadaet al v. ClaireDupond (1978), 19 N.R. 478 at 490
9. Id.
10. Id.at 489
11. (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117 (P.C.)
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of showing that it otherwise comes within one or more of the classes of
subjects enumerated in section 91 falls upon the party so asserting."
This reasoning overlooks the fact that it is the court itself which has so
characterized the By-law and ordinance.
The Court went on to distinguish the By-law from the unlawful
assembly provisions in the Criminal Code by stating that the Criminal
Code dealt with measures which were designed to cope with an
assembly in progress, whereas the Provincial regulation covered the
situation prior to an assembly. They then referred to a number of
decisions where provincial legislation, complementary to federal
legislation, was upheld on the basis that it did not collide with the latter.
In the final analysis the court adopted the position that the By-law and
the Criminal Code were complementary. Although the previous
decisions on concurrent jurisdiction seem to be supportive of the
majority one may question the original characterization of the By-law
as in relation to local matters. If it is not in relation to streets and parks
there is no room for the concept of concurrency.
Chief Justice Laskin, speaking for the dissent, stated that the city
was in fact legislating in relation to Criminal law by preventing what
would likely become an unlawful assembly. Furthermore, the By-law,
in particular section 5, was not aimed at regulating the streets and
public parks, but was in reality designed to maintain peace and public
order which is a function of the criminal law power. The By-law spoke
of exceptional measures to safeguard the free exercise of civil liberties.
In contrast Chief Justice Laskin maintained:
The reference to safeguarding the free exercise of civil liberties and
to regulation of the use of public domain are hollow references, not
in any way fulfilled by the substantial terms of the By-law as are the
references to riots, breach to the peace and public order. Moreover,
the enactment of the By-law as an exceptional measure is in itself an
indication of how far removed it is from any concern, except a
consequential one, with regulation of the use of streets and public
parks. 12
In addition the By-law was applicable to all persons - no matter
how innocent their gathering - which lent further credence to the
argument that the By-law was not for local regulation but rather
aimed at keeping the peace.
Chief Justice Laskin's position can be supported by reference to
s. 61 of the CriminalCode which defines an unlawful assembly as
an assembly
12. A. G. for Canada et al v. Claire Dupond (1978), 19 N.R. 478 at 517
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61. ... of three or more persons who with intent to carry out
any common purpose, assemble in such a manner or so conduct
themselves when they are assembled as to cause persons in the
neighbourhood of the assembly to fear, on reasonable grounds
that they
(a) will disturb the peace tumultuously;
(b) will by that assembly needlessly and without reasonable
cause provoke other persons to disturb the peace tumultuously.
2. Persons who are lawfully assembled may become an unlawful
assembly if they conduct themselves with a common purpose in a
manner that would have made the assembly unlawful in that
manner for that purpose.
The Code provisions thus make it an offence to engage in any
assembly which would include a demonstration or parade. This
section is sufficiently broad in scope to encompass any situations
which may have arisen in Montreal in 1969. The Code provisions
were specifically drafted to ensure that assemblies remained
peaceful by providing a penalty for violent assembly rather than by
requiring that all assemblies be prohibited. It can also be argued that
the Criminal Code sanctions are not only designed for purposes of
punishment of offenders but also to deter others from engaging in
these activities.
When Claire Dupond challenged the By-law the City of Montreal
was experiencing problems where the law enforcement agencies
were being unusually pressured. In justifying the legislation on the
basis that it dealt with a local concern and was preventive, the
Supreme Court majority chose the path of expediency since the
decision had the effect of making law enforcement less difficult.
Although one may sympathize with the Montreal authorities'
problems this cannot be used as a reason for supporting local
legislation. Also implicit in this reasoning was the assumption that
the Federal Code provisions did not serve this preventive function
but were designed solely to punish.
The majority decision, it can be argued, allows the creation of an
additional offence not provided for in the Criminal Code and not
merely part of a legitimate local concern for regulation of streets. It
can be argued further that by making violent assemblies and those
which disturb the peace unlawful, it was the intention of the drafters
of the Code to make all other assemblies lawful. The municipality
would then only have the power to regulate these as to location,
time and method of assembly.
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In conclusion, the Supreme Court majority characterized the
legislation as in relation to local matters and then proceeded to
follow previous decisions on concurrency. For those who support
this approach the decision will be welcomed; for those who fear the
further encroachment into individual lives by local authorities the
decision on the criminal law power will be undesirable. It does
allow courts in the future to further extend the doctrine of
concurrency at least where the court considers it a desirable
extension.
IH. FundamentalFreedoms
On the second ground of appeal the majority summarily rejected the
submission that section 5 was in relation to and in conflict with the
fundamental freedoms of assembly, speech and association. Rather
they criticized the submission for being worded in such vague terms as
"fundamental freedoms". Moreover, they emphasized the fact that
none of the freedoms mentioned were entrenched in the constitution
and no individual freedom could be labelled as exclusively federal or as
exclusively provincial. Mr. Justice Beetz, giving the reasons for the
majority went on to separate freedom of speech, association, press and
religion from the" faculty of holding assemblies, parades, gatherings,
demonstrations or processions on the public domain of a city." 1 3 He
continued "demonstrations are not a form of speech but of collective
action,"1 4 and thus are a display of force rather than an appeal to
reason. His conclusion was that demonstrations do not enter the realm
of speech. Finally he reverted to English common law stating that there
was no right to hold a public meeting in English law and therefore none
in Canadian law.
Although Chief Justice Laskin did not explicitly dwell on civil
liberties and fundamental freedoms in his judgment his concern
seemed implicitly voiced when he criticized the broad ambit of the
By-law to restrain the actions of innocent citizens. Since he relegated
the By-law to the realm of criminal law he obviously saw no need to
further discuss civil liberties.
In Dupond, then, the majority decision did not further the interests
of the individual. It rather restricted the concepts of fundamental
freedoms to exclude assemblies, parades, etc. It even left some doubt
as to whether the court itself accepted the concept of fundamental
13. Id. at 496-497
14. Id. at 497
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freedoms. A brief examination of the American and British approach
to the issue of public protest will assist the analysis of Dupond.
In the United States the question of fundamental freedoms is most
often resolved by reference to their constitutionally entrenched Bill of
Rights and the subsequent judicial interpretation of it. 15 The issue of
freedom to assemble, demonstrate, etc. has been the subject of a
number of court decisions which reflect the constant struggle to find a
satisfactory solution to the dilemma of the freedom to assemble,
demonstrate etc. versus the right of other citizens not to have their
rights seriously interfered with by the demonstrators. An early
decision and approach by the American Supreme Court gave a narrow
interpretation to public rights to utilize the public forum. 16 InDavies v.
Massachusetts, 17 a preacher was convicted under a city ordinance
which forbade any "public address" on "public property" unless a
permit from the mayor was obtained. In affirming the preacher's
conviction for preaching on the Boston commons, the court took the
position, by resorting to common law concepts of private property
rights, that a state possessed the power to prohibit free speech on public
property. Thus, private property rights were seen to take priority over
free speech. As the times and the constitution of the court changed in
the United States, new approaches to the public forum problem were
evolved. The emphasis began to shift more toward free speech and less
toward private property values. In two recent Supreme Court decisions
a more balanced approached has been developed. 18 In Graynedv. City
of Rockford the result was a test which required an assessment of
"whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." 19 Emphasis
was placed on the assumption that expressive activity, such as
demonstrations or open-air speeches, must be permitted unless a
sufficient justification for the contrary result is given. In Greer v.
15. The American Supreme Court has consistently maintained that the first
Amendement
rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.
Associated Press v. United States (1945), 326 U.S. 1, 20. [It] is only through
free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to
the will of the people and peaceful change is effected.
16. See Davis v. Massachusetts (1897), 167 U.S. 43
17. Id.
18. Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104; Greer v. Spock (1976), 96
S. Ct. 1211
19. Grayned, id. at 116
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Spock, Justice Powell articulated the current criteria to be used:
[I]t is not sufficient that the area in which the right of expression is
sought to be exercised be dedicated to some purpose other than use
as a 'public forum' or even that the primary business to be carried on
in the area may be disturbed by the unpopular viewpoint expressed.
Our inquiry must be more carefully addressed to the intrusion on the
specific activity involved and to the degree of infringement on the
First Amendment rights of the private parties. Some basic
between the communication and
incompatability must be discussed
20
the primary activity of an area.
The final result is an approach which balances unrestricted access
to public forum against absolute prohibition. If any activity is to be
prohibited in a public forum it must be prohibited because the
particular communication and the normal activity in the area are
basically incompatible. This approach permits a rational evaluation
of each demonstration, assembly, etc., rather than merely
classifying them in isolation from the area to be affected.
In Britain, as in Canada, the status of public protest is more
uncertain. Without the protection of an entrenched Bill of Rights a
citizen only has the right to engage in an activity if it is not
prohibited by statute. There are no limits on legislative supremacy
except the limit of public tolerance to government action. This
tolerance is often extensive when a minority is the subject of
legislation. Since nothing can be beyond the jurisdiction of the
legislature, restrictions on freedom of speech cannot be easily
challenged by the courts. With no constitutional guarantees of free
speech in Britain, there has been a history of regulation of free
expression in public places. The regulation of free speech has, as
initially in the United States, been based on the owner's property
rights - whether the owner was an individual or public body. It has
also been argued by a number of authors that there is no right to hold
public meetings - they are only allowed if not expressly forbidden
or the requisite conditions for holding them have been met. 2 1 Lord
Justice Scarman, in his report on the Red Lion Square disorder,
clearly states the problem confronting the common law with respect
to public order:
20. (1976), 96S. Ct. 1211 at 1220
21. See D. Williams, Keeping the Peace, The Police and Public Order (London:
Hutchinson, 1967); Harry Street, Freedom, The Individual and the Law
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1964) at 41 where he says:
Englishmen have no right to hold a public meeting anywhere, even if they begin
to hold public meetings in their own premises they will presumably need town
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Amongst our fundamental human rights there are without doubt
the fights of peaceful assembly and public protest and the right to
public order and tranquility. Civilized living collapses - it is
obvious - if public protest becomes violent protest or public
order degenerates into the quietism imposed by successful
oppression. But the problem is more complex than a choice
between two extremes - one, a fight to protest whenever and
wherever you will and the other, a right to continuous calm upon
our streets unruffled by the noise and obstructive pressure of the
protesting procession. A balance has to be struck, a compromise
found that will accommodate the exercise of the right to protest
within a framework of public order which enables ordinary
citizens who are not protesting, to go about their business and
pleasure without obstruction or inconvenience 22
The approach, as advocated by Lord Justice Scarman seems akin
to the attitude expressed by the American courts, but it is certainly
not the approach adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in
Dupond. In his report Lord Justice Scarman expressly maintained
that peaceful assembly is a fundamental fight. In the United States,
as previously noted, assembly is protected under the provisions
relating to free speech. Henry J. Abraham, in his book on Civil
Liberties in the United States, says freedom of expression is defined
as:
. . . freedom of expression connotes the broad freedom to
communicate a concept that far transcends mere speech. It
embraces the prerogative of the free citizen to express himself,
verbally, visually, or on paper. . . . It is vital to recognize at the
outset that the freedom of expression extends not only to speech
but also to such areas as press, assembly, petition, association,
lawful picketing and other demonstrative protests;...23
In the majority judgments expression in Dupond, i.e. that
demonstrations are not a form of speech, the court has effectively
and country planning permission from the local authority for this change in use
of the land.
Also see Brownie, The Law Relating to Public Order (London: Butterworths,

1968) at 191:
Even if one takes the view that it is fallacious to state that there is "no right of
public meeting" without more, it is nevertheless the case that the question of

legal restrictions is depressing. Moreover, there are no constitutionally
guaranteed rights in England and thus no approved criteria for evaluating
administrative action ...
22. (Feb. 1975; Cmnd. 5919) at para. 5
23. Freedom and the Court - Civil Rights and Liberties in the U.S. (3rd. ed. New
York: Oxford U. Press, 1977) at 171
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removed demonstrations, assemblies, etc. not only from the realm
of protection provided for free speech; but also removed them from
the scope of federal jurisdiction where previous decisions had
24
allocated most matters considered to be fundamental liberties.
These earlier cases in the Supreme Court, in contrast, generally
spoke of freedom of speech as a concern fundamental to our
democratic traditions and within the jurisdiction of the federal
legislature. One of Canada's greatest advocates of civil liberties,
reaffirming those decisions and contradicting the narrow interpretation given by the Court in Dupond, wrote
Without going too deeply into these aspects of the problem,
however, it is possible to single out certain essential requisites for
freedom of speech. Freedom of association is obviously one. My
right to talk is valueless unless I can talk to people. Speaking
implies an audience. Any law, any practice which strikes at the
right to form clubs, societies and associations or which prevents
them from holding meetings, open-air or otherwise is a direct
infringement on the right to freedom of speech. The right of
association includes the right to petition governing bodies of 25all
sorts and the right to hold parades under proper circumstances.
The greatest dangerin the narrow approach adopted by the Supreme
Court of Canada is that municipalities will be able to prohibit
assemblies at will if they can demonstrate that a possibility of violence
exists. In any situation where the cause is unpopular there will always
be opposition to that cause and an apprehension that some breach of the
peace may occur. In any of these instances it is highly likely that it
will be a minority view that is being expressed through the
mechanism of an assembly or demonstration. Often these groups
may not have ready access to other forum for the dissemination of
their views because of a lack of finances or mere discretionary
measures on the part of media sources to cover these views.
24. See for example, Reference Re Alberta Statutes, [19381 S.C.R. 100;

[19381

2

D.L.R. 81 where Cannon J. states:
Democracy cannot be maintained without its foundation: free public opinion
and free discussion throughout the nation of all matters affecting the state within
the limits set by the Criminal Code and the common law.
Also see Boucher v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 265; [1950] 1 D.L.R. 657 where

Rand says at 288:
Freedom in thought and speech and disagreement in ideas and beliefs, on every
conceivable subject, are of the essence of our life.
25. F. R. Scott, "Freedom of Speech in Canada" in Essays on the Constitution
(Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1977) p. 60 at 62
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It is at times of political stress, such as existed in Quebec, that it is
most essential to protect freedom of expression if Canadians truly
desire a democratic system. In times of tranquility, it is much easier to
tolerate the views of a particular minority group; but it is only at these
times of severe stress that a true test of belief in these values is
demanded.
The Supreme Court has failed to uphold these traditional values and
has, instead further eroded them by giving municipal officials license
to prevent even completely innocent demonstrations from occurring.
It can be argued that the balance between the need for free speech and
the need for tranquility has not been equitably drawn.
In sharp contrast is the recent U.S. decision allowing an unpopular
pro-nazi group to demonstrate in Chicago despite fears that anti-Nazi
groups would attempt to disrupt the march and cause violence. 26 The
ordinance which attempted to prohibit the march was considered too
broad in its statements of concern for a mere apprehension of violence.
This American view supports the approach previously adopted by the
American courts and is preferable to the Canadian Supreme Court's
validation of a By-law which absolutely forbids demonstrations, even
though there may be no prospect of violence.
This does not, of course, mean that there is an unlimited right to
assemble if the intention is to disrupt the peace. What is suggested is
that such an assessment should be made in each instance. If such
extensive suppressive measures are allowed in general, without
concern for liberties, the country will be in danger of subverting its
democratic prinicples.
Perhaps this decision is an element of Prime Minister Trudeau's call
for a re-affirmation of the need to protect the freedom of the citizens of
Canada in the interests of renewing the Federation. On page 8 of A
Time for Action Prime Minister Trudeau states:
Canadians will progress more rapidly in this direction if their
governments recognize the pre-eminence of their rights and
freedoms by entrenching them in the Constitutiont Perhaps it is not
essential to do this in a unitary state where one supreme parliament,
representing all the interests of the citizenry, canprovide an ultimate
guarantee for the rights of citizens. It is different in a federal system
where different orders of government, representing 2 different
7
interests of the same citizenry can have opposing views.
In his proposed changes to the Federal constitution an entrenched
26. Collins v. Smith, 5/22/78 (U.S. Court of Appeals for Seventh Circuit)
27. Supra, note I
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charter of human rights would be included. The Constitutional
Amendment Bill, s. 6 states that "freedom of peaceful assembly and
association" is to be one of the fundamental rights and freedoms.
However, this can only have significance if it ultimately becomes
applicable to both the Federal government and the Provinces. If
entrenched, this approach would not eliminate all problems since
judicial interpretation would still be required. Nevertheless, this
approach would be a direction to the court not to permit unlimited
legislative control over fundamental freedoms. Following Prime
Minister Trudeau's directives, the Canadian judicial system would
acquire a specific framework whereby legislation could be struck
down without engaging in a division of power balancing. Moreover the
almost unrestricted recognition of legislative freedom to restrain
fundamental freedoms, as articulated in Dupond would be avoided.
Without such an approach, local legislatures may, in the future, feel
free to continue restraint of individual liberties, at least in times of
political stress. Progressive courts could only, in the future, attempt to
limit this decision to the factual situation existing in Montreal in 1969.

